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Abstract The interpretation of size terms involves constructing contextually-relevant ref-
erence points by combining visual cues with knowledge of typical object sizes. This study
aims to establish at what age children learn to integrate these two sources of information in
the interpretation process and tests comprehension of the Dutch adjectives groot ‘big’ and
klein ‘small’ by 2- to 7-year-old children. The results demonstrate that there is a gradual
increase in the ability to inhibit visual cues and to use world knowledge for interpreting size
terms. 2- and 3-year-old children only used the extremes of the perceptual range as reference
points. From age four onwards children, like adults, used a cut-off point in the mid-zone of
a series. From age five on, children were able to integrate world knowledge and perceptual
context. Although 7-year-olds could make subtle distinctions between sizes of various object
classes, their performance on incongruent items was not yet adult-like.
Keywords Size terms · Language acquisition · Reference points · Adjectives
Introduction
Processing and Representation of Spatial Adjectives: System of Reference Points
This paper studies children’s developing ability to combine different sources of information
for interpreting spatial adjectives such as big and small. Adult language users commonly
employ a variety of cues for processing linguistic information. Semantic information from
words and sentences is easily integrated with world knowledge and perceptual cues (Hagoort
et al. 2004). Spatial expressions were shown to be a prime example of linguistic items whose
interpretation hinges on a complex system of reference points dynamically construed by inte-
grating lexical semantics with information supplied by our world knowledge and perceptually
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given context (Bryant 1997; Clark 1973; Coventry et al. 1994, 2001; Coventry and Garrod
2004; Garrod and Sandford 1989; Holyoak 1978; Šetic´ and Dominjan 2007). For example,
research on processing and representation of spatial prepositions demonstrates that adults rely
not only on geometric cues (i.e. perceptual information), but also, and sometimes primarily,
on extra-geometric knowledge of, for instance, canonical object functions and interaction
schemes (Coventry et al. 1994, 2001).
In a similar vein, semantic studies of spatial adjectives (e.g. big, small, high, low), and
relative adjectives in general, typically claim that their interpretation is contingent on a vari-
ety of context-specific reference points (Clark 1973; Holyoak 1978; Kennedy 2007; Paivio
1975; Rips and Turnbull 1980; Tribushinina 2008a). Most researchers of relative adjectives
suggest that the primary reference point used for interpreting these words is a so-called norm,
i.e. knowledge of average dimensions of a specific comparison class (Bierwisch 1967, 1989;
Kamp 1975; Lang 1989; Lehrer and Lehrer 1982; Leisi 1975; Lyons 1977; Sapir 1944). A
big elephant is big with respect to the class of elephants, and a big mosquito is big with
respect to the class of mosquitoes. Consequently, an adjective such as big may denote quite
different values depending on the comparison class being described.
However, a norm is not the only reference point that may be involved in the interpretation
of spatial adjectives. Ebeling and Gelman (1994) show that a sentence such as The hat is big
may be interpreted with respect to one of the three different reference points—a norm (bigger
than an average hat), a perceptual standard (bigger than another hat in the visual range) or
a functional standard of comparison (too big for a tiny doll). The experiments reported in
Ebeling and Gelman (1988, 1994) and Gelman and Ebeling (1989) demonstrate that adults
can easily choose one of these reference points and effortlessly switch between them.
However, it is not the case that people always have to choose one reference point for
adjective interpretation. Very often, their spatial judgments would rely on a combination
of reference points (for a detailed review, see Tribushinina 2008a). For instance, Rips and
Turnbull (1980) demonstrate that adult language users easily combine two conceptual refer-
ence points—knowledge of average sizes of a specific compassion class (e.g. flowers) and
knowledge of average sizes of various objects people daily deal with. Therefore, incongruent
sentences such as This poinsettia is tall (where the referent is tall with respect to indoor plants,
but short with respect to most objects in the human environment) take longer to process than
congruent items such as This spruce is tall (where the referent is tall within the class of trees
and tall with respect to everyday objects). Notice that both reference points involved in this
case are part of our world knowledge.
It is, however, also common to use two different sources of information—conceptual
knowledge and perceptual context—for assigning meanings to spatial adjectives. For
instance, Clark (1973: 36) claims that the adjective high in the sentence The balloon is high
is interpreted with respect to two different reference points at the same time—the visually
perceived ground level (or another reference plane) and conceptual knowledge of how high
a balloon can typically be located under particular circumstances, “for one would describe
a balloon as high in a room when it was perhaps 6 feet high, but in a large auditorium per-
haps only if it was 10–20 feet high” (Clark 1973: 36). Therefore, the application of high in
the above sentence is assumed to be contingent on a context-specific reference point that is
provided by an interaction of the perceptual and conceptual information.
Clark’s (1973) claim that the interpretation of spatial adjectives often involves interaction
of perceptual and conceptual reference points has been recently supported by comprehension
experiments reported in Tribushinina (2010). In these experiments, Dutch-speaking adults
were shown series of pictures incrementally decreasing or increasing in size. The subjects
were asked to indicate either big or small entities within each series. Object categories were
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manipulated across trials (e.g. elephants vs. mosquitoes), whereas the perceptual sizes of the
series remained constant across trials. A major result of interest was that the judgments were
clearly category-dependent. The subjects called more elephants ‘small’ than ‘big’, whereas
for mosquitoes, the pattern was reversed. This difference is clearly attributable to the fact
that all elephants in the test pictures were smaller than in real life, whereas all mosquitoes
were bigger than in reality. The observed pattern suggests that the adult subjects in these
experiments interpreted the adjectives groot ‘big’ and klein ‘small’ by integrating two differ-
ent reference points—an average size of the visually presented comparison class (the visual
range) and average sizes of the conceptually represented comparison class (world knowledge
of elephants/mosquitoes). If they had only used the visual context, they would have called an
equal number of pictures ‘big’ and ‘small’, because all test pictures were of exactly the same
size range. As against this, if they had only used their conceptual knowledge, they would
not have judged any of the elephants ‘big’ and any of the mosquitoes ‘small’, because all of
the test elephants were smaller and all of the mosquitoes bigger than in real life. The fact that
the subjects chose several elephants and several mosquitoes as being ‘big’ and ‘small’, but the
ranges labelled ‘big’ and ‘small’ were asymmetric, strongly suggests that their judgments
were based on a context-specific reference point constructed by integrating the reference
class in the visual context with their knowledge of object sizes in reality.
Tribushinina (2011) extended this work by including a greater variety of typically big and
typically small categories, as well as middle-sized categories. In that study, all test pictures
were smaller than in reality. As in the previous experiments, the adults applied the adjective
groot ‘big’ more often to typically small entities (e.g. mice, gnomes), whereas the adjec-
tive klein ‘small’ was more often used for typically big entities (e.g. elephants, hippos). As
expected, the middle-sized entities (e.g. umbrellas, cakes) occupied an intermediate position
between typically small and typically big categories. It is also noteworthy that incongruent
questions such as Which gnomes do you find big? incurred an additional processing effort
resulting in longer reaction times.
To summarize, both traditional semantic studies and recent psycholinguistic experiments
suggest that adults interpret spatial adjectives by integrating the available visual cues with
their world knowledge of typical object sizes. Adults can easily integrate perceptual and
conceptual information for assigning meanings to spatial adjectives, often without being
aware of this mental operation. However, situations where these two sources conflict rather
than converge (e.g. small for a conceptual reference point, but big within the visually given
range) are more complex and, therefore, require more processing time (Paivio 1975; Šetic´
and Dominjan 2007). This paper goes a step further and investigates children’s developing
ability to integrate different sources of information for interpreting spatial adjectives using
the scalar judgment procedure developed in Tribushinina (2011).
Before proceeding to the description of the experiment, let us briefly review some relevant
studies investigating children’s ability to use different reference points for interpreting spatial
adjectives.
The Acquisition of Reference Points for Size Terms
Ebeling and Gelman (1988) showed that 2-year-old children are able to use two different
standards of comparison for interpreting size terms. In their study, the children were first
asked whether objects showed one at a time were big or little. Toddlers as young as age 2;6
performed above chance and their judgments were clearly category-dependent. For instance,
they would dub a 10-cm big egg big, but a 10-cm big box of cereal little. In another ses-
sion, the same object was presented next to a smaller or a bigger object of the same kind.
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The subjects were able to shift their judgments when a perceptual reference point was intro-
duced. For example, a 10-cm egg presented next to an even bigger egg was re-labelled little
(cf. Syrett et al. 2010). Thus, by age three children are able to use either a conceptual or a per-
ceptual reference point for adjective interpretation. It is, however, not clear whether they are
also able to integrate the two sources of information into a more complex context-sensitive
reference point the way adults do (Tribushinina 2010, 2011).
To the best of my knowledge, the only study that has addressed this issue so far is Smith
et al. (1986). In a series of experiments, these authors investigated the ability of 3- to 5-year-
old children to construe contextually relevant reference points for high and low on the basis
of their knowledge of object classes and the extent of the visually given range. They found
that children initially attach size terms to the extremes of a series and later extend categories
to cover a broader range of values (cf. Berndt and Caramazza 1978; Clark 1970; Ehri 1976;
Smith et al. 1988). More precisely, most 3-year-olds accepted only the highest object as high
and only the lowest object as low in more than 50 % of cases. In contrast, 4- and 5-year-olds
defined broader categories and tended to divide the whole range into the regions of high or
low.
Smith and collaborators also report a growing ability to use contextual information in the
interpretation of size adjectives. 3-year-olds only took one perceptual factor into account—
extremes of the visually presented range; their judgments were not contingent on either
conceptual knowledge of object categories or a perceptually given range of variation. 4-year-
olds were capable of shifting the cut-off points for high and low depending on an object
category, but in a non-target-like way. Birds, i.e. animals prototypically located high in the
sky, were judged high more often than bunnies typically located low on the ground. Further-
more, 4-year-olds were not able to take the range of variation into account: their judgments
about objects moving along a 4-feet backdrop did not significantly differ from the judgments
made about objects on a 6-feet backdrop (but see Barner and Snedeker 2008). In contrast,
5-year-old children and adults took both the range of perceptual variation and the object
category into account. They dubbed more birds low and more bunnies high, because what is
high for a bunny is not necessarily high for a bird. Furthermore, more objects were labelled
high or low when the backdrop was 6-feet high than when it was 4-feet high.
In summary, it appears that children start to integrate the visually present comparison-class
information with their knowledge of reality from age 5 onwards. However, there are still a
number of important open questions to be addressed.
Aims of this Study
The experiment reported below builds on the work of Smith et al. (1986, 1988) and extends
it in several important ways. Firstly, in order to study the emerging ability to integrate per-
ceptual and conceptual reference points, we need a sharper contrast between standards of
comparison provided by the visual range and those supplied from world knowledge. Smith
and colleagues worked with objects that moved along a 4- to 6-feet high backdrop. In that
sense, the location of the target objects (birds and bunnies) was very similar, and some-
times identical, to their location in reality. This is especially evident for birds that are only
sometimes located high in the sky: very often they would merely sit on the ground or in
the bushes. And, similarly, some positions of the bunnies in the experiment were identical
to their normal positions in reality. In this case, the information provided by the percep-
tual range significantly coincides with the information provided by world knowledge. Thus,
it is not completely clear whether the children simply relied on one source of information
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(visual range or world knowledge) or used a combination of the two. The answer to this ques-
tion can only be obtained if we tease visual context and world knowledge apart. Therefore,
in the experiment reported below, all objects in the test pictures will be smaller than in reality
so that the subjects will be forced either to choose between the two reference points or to
integrate them into a more complex reference point.
Secondly, in order to determine whether sensitivity of older children to prototypes (birds
and bunnies) reported by Smith and colleagues can be generalized to other prototypes, we
need to employ a greater variety of prototypical, as well as prototype-neutral stimuli. Previous
semantic research shows that, across languages, dimensional adjectives reveal prototypical-
ity effects in the sense that they are intrinsically associated with best exemplars, such as an
elephant for big, a mouse for small and a tower for tall (Dirven and Taylor 1988; Tribushinina
2008a; Vogel 2004; Weydt and Schlieben-Lange 1998). Such best exemplars were shown to
play an important role in the acquisition of size terms. Analyses of longitudinal transcripts of
spontaneous speech of English- and Dutch-speaking children revealed that early in develop-
ment dimensional adjectives are overwhelmingly used with reference to best exemplars by
both children and their caregivers (Tribushinina in press). Later, the proportion of such proto-
typical referents decreases (Tribushinina 2008b). And in spoken adult corpora the proportion
of adjective uses with reference to best exemplars is very low, due to redundancy of such
modifications (Dirven and Taylor 1988; Tribushinina 2008a: Ch. 9). Given the important role
of best exemplars in the acquisition of size terms, it is crucial to continue the line of research
started by Smith et al. (1986) by testing the generalizability of the results to a larger set of
prototypes and by comparing children’s performance on prototypes and prototype-neutral
categories.
The experiment reported in this paper will do just this by investigating the comprehension
of the Dutch adjectives groot ‘big’ and klein ‘small’ by 2- to 7-year-old children. The reason
to confine this research to only two size terms is that these are the least complex dimensional
adjectives and the first ones acquired by Dutch children (Tribushinina in press). Groot ‘big’
and klein ‘small’ denote overall size and emerge in child speech around children’s second
birthdays, whereas other size terms denoting more specific dimensions (e.g. hoog ‘high/tall’,
diep ‘deep’, breed ‘wide’) are more complex and acquired later (Bartlett 1975; Brewer and
Stone 1975; Eilers et al. 1974; Tribushinina in press). The inclusion of more complex size
terms would make the task too difficult for the youngest subjects in this study.
Hypotheses
Based on previous research reviewed in the introduction, the following predictions can be
made.
Hypothesis 1: From Distinct Endpoints to a Common Midpoint
As in prior studies on English (Berndt and Caramazza 1978; Clark 1970; Ehri 1976; Smith
et al. 1986, 1988), Dutch-speaking children are expected to start by attaching adjectives only
to the extreme values of a scale and later discover a reference point around the mid-zone of
a series. From age four onwards, children are likely to use a cut-off point between ‘big’ and
‘small’ located around the midpoint of a series, because at this age they typically learn to
order series (Ehri 1976) and realize that antonymous adjectives are converse relations of one
another sharing a common reference point in the middle of the scale (Smith et al. 1988).
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Hypothesis 2: Integration of Perceptual and Conceptual Reference Points
If language learners are able to integrate perceptual information with their world knowledge
of object classes from age five onwards (cf., Smith et al. 1986), this will be manifest in
the number of objects labelled ‘big’ and ‘small’. More precisely, children younger than age
five should select an equal number of objects for ‘small’ and ‘big’. From age five onwards,
children, like adults in the previous experiments (Tribushinina 2010, 2011), will call more
objects ‘small’ than ‘big’, because all test stimuli are smaller than in reality.
Hypothesis 3: Prototypicality of Object Categories
If children are able to use prototypicality information in an adult-like way from age five
onwards (cf. Smith et al. 1986), they will call more objects from the prototypically big cat-
egories (e.g. elephants) klein ‘small’ and more objects from the typically small categories
(e.g. mice) groot ‘big’. The number of objects dubbed ‘big’ and ‘small’ in the prototype-
neutral categories (e.g. umbrellas) should be between the two prototypical categories. At
younger ages, language learners are expected to make category-independent judgments, op-




Participants were 150 children (76 male, 74 female). All participants were native speak-
ers of Netherlandic Dutch. The children were divided into six age groups (25 subjects
per group)—2-year-olds (M = 2;7, range = 1;10–2;11), 3-year-olds (M = 3;6, range =
3;1–3;11), 4-year-olds (M = 4;6, range = 4;0–4;11), 5-year-olds (M = 5;4, range = 5;0–
5;11), 6-year-olds (M = 6;6, range = 6;0–6;11) and 7-year-olds (M = 7;5, range = 7;0–8;0).
The children came primarily from middle-class families and attended either a primary school
or a day nursery in the Amsterdam area. The control group were 25 adults (10 male, 15 female)
recruited in the Amsterdam and Utrecht areas. Informed consent was obtained from all adult
participants and parents/guardians of the children.
Materials
The procedure developed by Tribushinina (2011) for research with adults was adopted in this
study and adjusted for research with children. The test materials were 48 coloured computer-
generated images of seven same-kind objects incrementally increasing or decreasing in size
(see Fig. 1). The pictures were presented on a 15-inch computer screen.
Each picture was accompanied by a pre-recorded question uttered by a child-friendly
female voice. The target question was always: Welke X vind je groot/klein? ‘Which X do you
find big/small?’, where X was the name of the object category in plural. This formulation
was chosen for two reasons. First, the construction with the verb vinden ‘find’ is the most
common way to express subjective judgements in both adult and child Dutch. Second, pilot
studies with adults showed that a more objective formulation of the question, such as Welke
X zijn groot/klein ‘Which X are big/small?’, made some of the participants think that they
were supposed to give consistent answers across all trials. Crucially, however, in our daily
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Fig. 1 Example of a test stimulus (typically big, descending)
practices we produce and interpret dimensional terms in a very subjective, situation-specific
way. In order to underline that the subjects were expected to give subjective judgments of
every situation, the more subjective sentence frame with the verb vinden ‘find’ was opted for.
The best exemplars of ‘bigness’ and ‘smallness’ used in this study were selected from
the Dutch picture-books meant to teach the meaning of dimensional adjectives to toddlers.
Two further selection criteria were applied. First, the nouns denoting the target categories
had to be known and used by 2-year-old children. This was established on the basis of longi-
tudinal transcripts of seven Dutch-speaking children from the Groningen Corpus (Bol 1995)
available in the CHILDES archive (MacWhinney 2000). The familiarity of the nouns to the
subjects was also tested in a pre-experimental trial (see below).
The second criterion was strength of association with bigness and smallness in child
speech and child-directed speech in the Dutch CHILDES corpora (Tribushinina in press).
For the prototypically big categories, more than 70 % of the size descriptions in child and
caregivers’ speech were to involve the adjective groot ‘big’. For the typically small entities,
more than 70 % of the size descriptions in the corpus had to contain the adjective klein ‘small’.
Prototype-neutral entities were selected from a range of categories described by groot and
klein about equal number of times (50 %) in the longitudinal transcripts.
The categories obtained from these procedures were judged by 15 adult speakers of Dutch
in a scaling task. The subjects, none of whom participated in the main experiment, were asked
to indicate how big the entities were on a 10-point scale. Only the categories with a mean
score above 7 were selected as typically big entities. Similarly, only the categories with a
mean score below 3.5 were selected as best exemplars of smallness. The prototype-neu-
tral categories had a mean score between 3.5 and 7. This procedure provided twelve test
categories—four best exemplars of bigness (elephants, hippos, houses, planes), four best
exemplars of smallness (mice, chickens, gnomes, babies) and four prototype-neutral cat-
egories that are not intrinsically associated with either of the properties (balloons, cakes,
monkeys, umbrellas).
Test items from each category were presented in two different orders—ascending and
descending. On the ascending trials, the stimuli increased in vertical size from 1 to 7 cm, at
one centimetre intervals. On the descending trials, the vertical size of the entities decreased
from 7 to 1 cm, at 1 cm intervals. Each picture was shown two times, once with groot ‘big’ and
once with klein ‘small’ as a target adjective. This produced the total of 48 experimental trials.
Procedure
The children were tested individually in a quiet room at their nursery or school. The adults
were tested either in a quiet room at the university or at home. The subjects were sitting
in front of the computer and the experimenter was sitting next to the subject. Before the
experiment started, each child received a pre-test and two training trials.
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The pre-test was used to make sure that the children knew the object categories used in the
main experiment. The subjects were shown pictures of several creatures including the ones
used in the study, and asked to show the investigator each of the creatures by touching them
on the screen (e.g. Where is the elephant? Can you touch the elephant?). In order to activate
children’s knowledge of size differences between the categories, the size of the pictures pro-
portionally reflected the actual size differences between the real-life categories. For example,
a mouse and a gnome in the pre-test pictures were much smaller than an elephant and a hippo.
And the size of the prototype-neutral stimuli was between the two extremes. This activation
was necessary because the test pictures of all categories in the main experiment were of the
same size range.
For some of the categories (e.g. monkeys), more than one exemplar picture was included
in a series. This was done in order to demonstrate that there always can be more than one
target object in the pictures. For the same reason, all nouns denoting referent categories were
always presented in the plural form. This was important because younger children are known
to attach size terms only to the extreme points of a range (Smith et al. 1986, 1988).
The pre-test was followed by two training trials. The first training trial involved pictures
of eleven balloons—five pink ones, four blue ones and two yellow ones. The subjects were
asked to point to the balloons that they found pretty (Welke ballonnen vind je mooi? ‘Which
balloons do you find pretty?’). And in the second training trial the participants saw pictures
of six different cars and were asked to show the experimenter the cars that they found ugly
(Welke auto’s vind je lelijk? ‘Which cars do you find ugly?’). In this way, the participants
received some practice in making subjective judgments about a range of objects.
The training trials were followed by 48 experimental trials pseudo-randomized with
respect to two factors: the side of the target response (left or right) and the target adjective
(groot or klein). Younger children—2-, 3- and 4-year-olds—took two short breaks during
which they could choose a small present. Older children—5-, 6- and 7-year-olds—had one
break halfway through the experiment. The adult subjects fulfilled the whole experiment
without breaks. The sessions were videotaped using a JVC Everio Camcorder.
Two 2-year-old children failed the pre-test and were excluded from the study. One 2-year-
old child and one 3-year-old child passed the pre-test, but failed to understand the main test.
They always pointed at all seven objects on both ‘big’ and ‘small’ trials. The data from these
children were not included in the analysis.
For each trial, the objects dubbed groot or klein were registered. For example, if the child
selected the 1-, 2- and 3-cm tall objects as klein ‘small’, objects 1 through 3 were registered,
as well as the total number of selected items (three, in this case). By age group, the proportion
of subjects selecting each of the seven objects as being either big or small was obtained. The
mean number of objects dubbed groot and klein was calculated for each of the experimental
categories (typically big, typically small and prototype-neutral entities).
Results
In this section, I will first consider which objects children chose for groot ‘big’ and klein
‘small’ to test whether there is indeed a transition from using two distinct endpoints to a
common reference point in the middle of the scale (Hypothesis 1). Then I will compare the
mean number of objects dubbed groot ‘big’ and klein ‘small’ across all categories to see
from what age children start taking two sources of information into account (Hypothesis 2).
Finally, I will compare the mean number of objects labelled groot ‘big’ and klein ‘small’ in
the three experimental conditions to establish whether children are sensitive to prototypicality
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of objects in terms of size (Hypothesis 3). Paired-samples T tests showed that across all age
groups there were no significant differences between ascending and descending trials (all p
values above .05). Therefore, the data were collapsed across these two conditions.
From Distinct Endpoints to a Common Midpoint
The first hypothesis to be explored is whether Dutch-speaking children, like the English-
speaking subjects in the previous experiments, start by attaching the size terms only to the
endpoint of a scale and later come to use a cut-off point located around the midpoint of a
series. In order to test this, the percentages of trials on which each of the seven objects was
selected as either groot ‘big’ or klein ‘small’ to the total number of trials were calculated.
Figure 2 presents the results for adults.
As in previous experimental studies (Smith et al. 1986; Syrett et al. 2010; Tribushinina
2011), adults placed a cut-off point between ‘big’ and ‘small’ around the midpoint of a series.
Further, as predicted, the cut-off point was skewed towards the bigger pole, because all test
objects were smaller than in reality. Now compare the adult data in Fig. 2 with the judgments
obtained from children (Fig. 3).
For the adjective groot ‘big’, a 7×7 Mixed ANOVA with age (2-, 3-, 4-, 5-, 6-, 7-year-olds,
adults) as a between-subjects factor and object size (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 cm) as a within-subjects
factor conducted on the proportion of applications of the adjective groot ‘big’ indicated a sig-
nificant effect of age (F(1, 164) = 7.1, M SE = 1, 306.9, p < .001, η2p = .2) and of object
size (F(6, 984) = 638.9, M SE = 350.9, p < .001, η2p = .8), as well as a significant object
by age interaction (F(36, 984) = 10.4, p < .001, η2p = .28). Likewise, for klein ‘small’, a
7 × 7 Mixed ANOVA with age (2-, 3-, 4-, 5-, 6-, 7-year-olds, adults) as a between-subjects
factor and object size (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 cm) as a within-subjects factor revealed a significant
effect of age (F(1, 164) = 10.4, M SE = 1, 532.1, p < .001, η2p = .28) and of object size
(F(6, 984) = 574.9, M SE = 377.7, p < .001, η2p = .78), as well as a significant object by
age interaction (F(36, 984) = 11.7, p < .001, η2p = .3).
The pattern of results in Fig. 3 demonstrates that 2- and 3-year-old children attach the
size terms to the extremes of a range. As in previous research (Berndt and Caramazza 1978;
Clark 1970; Ehri 1976; Smith et al. 1986, 1988), children younger than age four agreed
to dub only the biggest object groot and only the smallest one klein in more than 50 % of
the cases. The only significant difference between 2- and 3-year-olds was that the younger
children were about 80 % correct on the extreme objects, whereas the older subjects were
94 % correct on the groot trials and 95 % correct on the klein trials. Two-year-olds, like adults











Fig. 2 Percentage of test pictures dubbed groot and klein (adults)
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Fig. 3 Percentage of test pictures dubbed groot and klein (children)
object when the stimulus was groot ‘big’. Even though the performance of the youngest
group seems similar to that of the oldest groups, the motivation for this performance was not
the same. The adult subjects and the oldest children were reluctant to call the test objects
‘big’ and sometimes refused to apply groot to any stimuli because they were all smaller than
in real life. As against this, the youngest children sometimes failed to choose the biggest
object as ‘big’ and the smallest as ‘small’ and pointed to a different object instead, either to
a non-extreme object or to the opposite pole (the biggest object for ‘small’ and the smallest
object for ‘big). This non-target-like performance of the youngest group is most likely due to
immature knowledge of adjective semantics and to a relatively limited processing capacity.
Four-year-olds were 100 % correct with the extreme objects. Furthermore, they clearly
used a cut-off point located precisely in the middle of the scale to divide the range into the
realms of groot and klein. The fact that the ranges of groot and klein assigned by 4-year-old
subjects were perfectly symmetric suggests that they only used a reference point constructed
on the basis of the perceptual range and did not bring in their knowledge of typical sizes in
reality. From age five onwards, we observe an increasingly asymmetric distribution of groot
and klein, which might be evidence of integrating world knowledge and perceptual cues. This
observation will be tested in the following subsection.
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Table 1 Mean number of objects dubbed groot and klein
groot ‘big’ klein ‘small’
M SD M SD
2-year-olds 1.64 1.5 1.5 1.35
3-year-olds 1.86 1.68 1.63 1.36
4-year-olds 2.87 1.4 2.91 1.51
5-year-olds 2.57 0.98 2.88 1.18
6-year-olds 2.77 0.82 3.2 0.97
7-year-olds 2.37 1.04 3.13 1.38
Adults 1.64 0.94 2.65 1.32
Integration of Perceptual and Conceptual Reference Points
As explained above, the ability to integrate perceptual and conceptual comparison classes
was operationalized as a difference between the mean number of objects labelled groot ‘big’
and klein ‘small’. More precisely, if children are able to integrate the two sources of informa-
tion for interpreting spatial adjectives, they will call more objects ‘small’ than ‘big’, because
all test objects were smaller than in real life. Table 1 presents the mean number of objects
dubbed groot and klein by age group.
A 7 × 2 Mixed ANOVA with age group (2-; 3-; 4-; 5-; 6-; 7-year-olds; adults) as a
between-subjects factor and target adjective (groot; klein) as a within-subjects factor revealed
significant main effects of age (F(6, 164) = 27.4, M SE = 21, 417.6, p < .001, η2p = .5)
and adjective (F(1, 164) = 32.02, M SE = 152.8, p < .001, η2p = .163), as well as a
significant age by adjective interaction (F(6, 164) = 8.2, p < .001, η2p = .23). Posthoc T
tests with Bonferroni adjustment showed that the difference between the mean numbers of
objects labelled groot and klein were not significantly different in the group of 2- (p = .2),
3- (p = .6) and 4-year-olds (p = .8). Significantly more objects were dubbed klein than
groot by 5- (t (24) = 2.7, p = .01), 6- (t (24) = 2.6, p = .02) and 7-year-olds (t (24) = 3.4,
p = .002), as well as by adults (t (24) = 5.2, p < .001).
A quadratic fit of the data from 2 to 7 years (see Fig. 4) shows that the mean number of
objects selected as klein ‘small’ grows until 6 years with a plateau after that (R2 = 0.89).
By contrast, the mean number of objects dubbed groot ‘big’ grows until age 5 and decreases
afterwards (R2 = 0.81). This pattern is consonant with the hypothesis that children will be
able to construct reference points by combining different sources of information from around
age five. It is plausible that adults and older children constructed a novel reference point by
combining the mid-point of the visual range with their knowledge of object sizes in reality.
This integration motivated a shift from the exact midpoint (as attested in 4-year-olds) towards
the bigger end of the scale. As a result, from age 5 onwards children are more reluctant to
apply groot ‘big’ to objects that are smaller than in real life.
Prototypicality of Object Categories
Recall that if children are able to use object-class information in a target-like way, then the
degree of reference-point shift towards the bigger pole in their judgments should be con-
tingent upon the typical size of the specific categories. Put another way, the mean number
of objects dubbed ‘big’ and ‘small’ should be category-dependent. The mean number of
123




































typically big prototype-neutral typically small
Fig. 5 Mean number of objects dubbed groot ‘big’ by category and age group
entities from the TYPICALLY BIG, TYPICALLY SMALL and PROTOTYPE-NEUTRAL
categories labelled groot ‘big’ is presented in Fig. 5.
The application of groot by the adult subjects was clearly category-dependent, which
replicates the results reported in Tribushinina (2011). The groot zone was the biggest for
objects from the typically small category and the smallest for objects from the typically big
category. The prototype-neutral entities occupied a position between the two extremes. A
Repeated Measures ANOVA with object category (typically big; typically small; prototype-
neutral) as a within-subjects factor shows that there are significant differences between the
three experimental conditions: F(2, 48) = 9.7, M SE = 8.02, p < .001, η2p = .287. Pos-
thoc Bonferroni pair-wise comparisons show significant differences between typically large
and typically small entities (p = .005) and between prototype-neutral and large entities
(p = .02). The difference between prototype-neutral and typically small entities was not
significant (p = .06).
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typically big prototype-neutral typically small
Fig. 6 Mean number of objects dubbed klein ‘small’ by category and age group
Unlike in adults, the judgments of 2- to 6-year-old children were not category-dependent
(all p values above .05). Only at age seven, we observe an adult-like pattern. Seven-year-olds,
like adults, were reluctant to call typically big objects groot. And, conversely, they tended to
dub more entities from the typically small category groot. However, the differences between
the three conditions were not significant: F(2, 48) = 2, M SE = 7.1, p = .1.
Figure 6 shows the mean number of objects labelled klein ‘small’ by condition and age
group.
Yet again, the adult subjects applied the adjective klein in a category-dependent way. The
broadest klein ranges were found in the typically big category, whereas the least number
of klein objects was attested in the typically small category: F(2, 48) = 9.7, p < .001,
M SE = 14.9, η2p = .287. Posthoc Bonferroni pair-wise comparisons revealed significant
differences between typically large and typically small entities (p = .008), as well as between
prototype-neutral and typically large categories (p = .008). The difference between typically
small and prototype-neutral entities was not significant (p = .07).
As in the case of groot, only the group of 7-year-old children showed an adult-like pattern
with klein. The difference between the three conditions proved significant: F(1, 48) = 4.1,
M SE = 10.4, p = .02, η2p = .161. Posthoc Bonferroni comparisons revealed a significant
difference between typically large and typically small entities (p = .02). The differences
between prototype-neutral entities and two prototypical groups were not significant (p = 1
and p = .2).
To summarize, only the oldest child group in this study (7-year-olds) started making subtle
distinctions between various categories when applying their world knowledge to the inter-
pretation of the size terms groot ‘big’ and klein ‘small’. The difference between the three
conditions (typically big, typically small and prototype-neutral) was more pronounced for
the adjective klein ‘small’.
Conclusion and Discussion
Developing Ability to Construct Reference Points
This study targeted the developing ability to interpret size terms by integrating world knowl-
edge with the visually provided cues. Based on previous research, three predictions were
made. First, it was hypothesized that children would start with two distinct reference points
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Table 2 Age differences in size term interpretation
Primary reference point Available sources of reference points Integration
2-year-olds Endpoints (best exemplars) Perceptual range; world knowledge No
3-year-olds Endpoints (best exemplars) Perceptual range; world knowledge No
4-year-olds Midpoint (average) Perceptual range; world knowledge No
5-year-olds Midpoint (average) Perceptual range; world knowledge Yes
6-year-olds Midpoint (average) Perceptual range; world knowledge Yes
7-year-olds Midpoint (average) Perceptual range; world knowledge Yes
Adults Midpoint (average) Perceptual range; world knowledge Yes
for ‘big’ and ‘small’ (endpoints of the visual range) and later discover a common reference
point in the mid-zone of a scale. Second, children were expected to construct reference points
by combining information provided by a visually present comparison class and a concep-
tually represented comparison class from age five onwards. Third, 5-year-old children were
also expected to use object-class information in a target-like way by making different size
judgments about typically big/small entities and for object classes not particularly associated
with either of the size terms. An overview of the results, combined with insights from prior
research (Ebeling and Gelman 1988, 1994; Gelman and Ebeling 1989; Smith et al. 1986,
1988) is presented in Table 2. The results for each of the hypotheses will be discussed in turn.
Hypothesis 1: From Distinct Endpoints to a Common Midpoint
As expected, 2- and 3-year-old children applied the adjectives groot ‘big’ and klein ‘small’
only to the endpoints of the scale in more than 50 % of cases. This result replicates earlier
findings on children acquiring English (Berndt and Caramazza 1978; Clark 1970; Ehri 1976;
Smith et al. 1986, 1988). Only at age four, children seem to discover the common reference
point for ‘big’ and ‘small’ located around the midpoint of a series. Ehri (1976) claims that
this transition is related to the developing ability to order objects by size. Children younger
than age four are able to sort objects categorically by putting small and big things in two
different groups, but they are not yet capable of ordering them. The ability to order objects
develops between ages four and five and was shown to affect children’s comprehension of
size terms (Ehri 1976).
Before language learners have discovered the common reference point for ‘big’ and
‘small’, they do not understand the inverse relations between the antonymous terms and
use comparatives immaturely by applying ‘bigger’ only to big objects and ‘smaller’ only
to small objects, and not along the whole scale, as in adult language (Smith et al. 1988).
Thus, the transition from two distinct reference points at the extreme poles of the scale to
a common reference point in the middle of a series heralds an important transition to more
mature adjective semantics.
Hypothesis 2: Integration of Perceptual and Conceptual Reference Points
Taking as a starting point the findings reported in Smith et al. (1986), it was hypothesized
that the capacity to construct contextually-relevant reference points by combining differ-
ent sources of information emerges around age five. In line with this prediction, children
123
J Psycholinguist Res (2013) 42:205–225 219
in this study took two sources of information—world knowledge and the visual context—
into account from age five onwards. Before that time, children labelled the same number
of objects groot ‘big’ and klein ‘small’, even though all test items were smaller than in real
life. From age five on, we observe asymmetric distributions of the antonymous terms. More
precisely, the cut-off point is shifted from the midpoint of the scale towards the bigger pole.
These results are most likely related to the fact that adults and older children were reluctant
to call a lot of test pictures—that were all smaller than in real life—groot ‘big’. This pattern
is consistent with the claim that from age five onwards children are able to use multiple
reference points for interpreting relative terms.
An alternative explanation of this pattern might be that children come to label more objects
‘small’ because they become bigger as they grow and the things in the world become smaller
and smaller. However, there are two counterarguments to this explanation. First, one of the
experiments reported in Smith et al. (1986) showed that the 3- to 5-year-old children did not
define the denotations of high and low depending upon their own vertical position (either
sitting on the floor or standing on a ladder). Based upon these results, the authors suggest
that children have a primary external rather than egocentric definition of spatial adjectives.
Secondly, it is important that the response patterns of children aged five to seven are
similar to those of adults. Recall also that the adult subjects in a prior experiment where
test pictures were bigger than objects in real life (Tribushinina 2010) revealed an opposite
pattern by calling more objects ‘big’ than ‘small’. This finding confirms the idea that adults
construe contextually relevant reference points from two different comparison classes—the
visual range and knowledge of object classes in real life. It is very likely that 5-, 6- and
7-year-olds in the present experiment did the same and, therefore, called significantly more
objects klein ‘small’ than groot ‘big’. Notice, however, that the experiment reported in this
paper only included test items that were smaller than in real life. In order to rule out the
possibility that 5-year-olds come to call more objects ‘small’ because they grow themselves
and their perspective on the world changes, future research may conduct a similar experiment
with pictures of entities that are all bigger than in real life (e.g. mosquitoes, pins, lady-birds).
Hypothesis 3: Prototypicality of Object Categories
The idea that older children in the present experiment labelled more objects ‘small’ than ‘big’
because they started integrating reference classes provided by the visual knowledge with their
background knowledge of object classes in real life is also supported by the finding that the
oldest children in the experiment (7-year-olds) were able to make subtle distinctions between
various object categories, which is a plausible further developmental step. The hypothesis
that children would be able to distinguish between prototypically big, prototypically small
and prototype-neutral entities from age five onwards was not supported by the experimental
data. It is only from age seven that the children’s scalar judgments were contingent on an
object category. The greatest number of ‘small’ referents was assigned in the TYPICALLY
BIG category and the smallest number in the TYPICALLY SMALL category. In the case of
‘big’, the distribution was reversed.
However, even 7-year-olds were not completely adult-like—they had more trouble with
the incongruent (big) trials. As explained in the Introduction, incongruent trials incur an
additional processing effort and result in longer reaction times even in adults (Tribushinina
2011). On these trials, the subjects were asked to indicate objects that were small for a con-
ceptually available comparison class, but big within the visually given comparison class. As
against this, on the small-trials both sources of information converged (small for a real-life
class and small for a visual range). Consequently, it does not come as a surprise that children
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had more trouble integrating the two sources of information when they conflicted (i.e. on
the big-trials) than when they converged (i.e. on the small-trials). Therefore, the difference
between the three experimental categories was more pronounced on the ‘small’ trials than
on the ‘big’ trials.
Why is Reference-Point Integration Difficult?
The fact that younger children in this study were not able to integrate visual and conceptual
reference points into a complex context-specific standard of comparison does not mean they
cannot use perceptual and conceptual reference points. Prior research has repeatedly shown
that toddlers as young as age 2;6 are capable of using both normative (i.e. conceptual) and
perceptual standards of comparison, one at a time (Ebeling and Gelman 1988, 1994; Gelman
and Ebeling 1989). However, it is not until age five that they learn to construe complex ref-
erence points by combining two sources of information—world knowledge and perceptual
context (cf. Smith et al. 1986). The question is then why younger children fail to integrate
reference points while they can use them one at a time.
It is plausible to assume that the ability to integrate different sources of information for
adjective interpretation is facilitated by the development of executive functions, including
working memory, inhibition and cognitive control. Executive functions are strongly associ-
ated with the prefrontal cortex, which is the last cortical region to reach full development
(Kanemura et al. 2003). The prefrontal cortex is crucial for integrating multiple relations
(Walz et al. 1999), for integrating word meaning and world knowledge (Hagoort et al. 2004)
and for controlling interference from perceptual and semantic distracters during relational
processing (Krawczyk et al. 2008). These skills play a key role in the process of interpreting
spatial adjectives by construing contextually relevant reference points.
The core components of executive function show a developmental spurt between 3 and
6 years of age (Garon et al. 2008). In this period, children learn to integrate strategies (so-
called ‘rules’) for solving problems. For example, when 3-year-olds are asked to sort things
by, say, colour (If red, put in box A. If green, put in box B.), they tend to perform this task
successfully irrespective of the dimension being used. However, when they are asked to play
a new game with the same objects using a new pair of rules (If triangle, put in box A. If
circle, put in box B.), most 3-year-olds fail to shift to the new rule (e.g. shape) and keep
using the pre-switch rule (colour). Furthermore, Zelazo et al. (1996) found that 3-year-olds
continue to use pre-switch rules even though they are perfectly aware of the new rule and can
express knowledge of that rule both manually and verbally. By contrast, 4- and 5-year-olds
can sort by one and by one of the two varying dimensions (rule switch condition). And from
age five on children are able to sort by two dimensions simultaneously (Fischer and Roberts
1989; Frye et al. 1995). This means that from age five onwards children are able to integrate
multiple rules for solving problems. This is exactly what is needed for interpreting relative
adjectives vis-à-vis several reference points at the same time. In line with this developmental
trend, the 5-year-old subjects in this experiment were able to take both conceptual and per-
ceptual comparison classes into account. Children under age five are not yet able to integrate
strategies (Frye et al. 1995; Zelazo et al. 1996; Zelazo and Reznik 1991). Rather they use
one particular strategy at a time. In the present experiment, the subjects younger than age
five made scalar judgments on the basis of the perceptual range alone.
According to the Cognitive Complexity and Control theory (Zelazo and Frye 1998), youn-
ger children cannot reflect on rules they know to integrate conflicting pieces of knowledge
into a more complex, hierarchical rule system (Zelazo 2004; Zelazo et al. 1996: 57). And
this is exactly what is needed to be able to construct complex reference points for relative
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adjectives. Children know which elephants are big or small within the visually provided
contexts. They also know that elephants are prototypically big entities. And they know that a
picture elephant is smaller than a real elephant. However, children younger than age five are
not able to integrate these pieces of knowledge into a more complex reference-point system.
Another important question is why children who are not yet able to integrate reference
points choose for a perceptual comparison class rather than for a conceptual one, if both are
available to them? This pattern is most likely related to the fact that visual context is percep-
tually salient and, therefore, more accessible and more difficult to inhibit than conceptual
knowledge. The inhibition capacity shows a developmental spurt between 3 and 6 years of
age (Bialystok and Senman 2004; Davidson et al. 2006). Therefore, on a scalar judgement
task like the one used in this study, children younger than age five make scalar judgments on
the basis of the perceptual range alone, rather than on the basis of world knowledge alone. In
the same vein, Ebeling and Gelman (1994) report that both children and adults switch more
easily from a normative to a perceptual interpretation of size terms than the other way around.
Although the results of the present study are consistent with the idea that the ability to
integrate reference points is closely related to the development of executive functions (see
also Sassoon 2011), this idea has not been subjected to experimental scrutiny yet. To explore
this idea, future studies will need to correlate a child’s cognitive control and inhibition capac-
ities with her ability to interpret adjectives with respect to several reference classes at the
same time. It is also possible that bilingual children who are used to inhibiting one of their
languages would have an advantage over monolingual children or bilinguals speaking two
languages in two different environments (e.g. one at school and the other at home) (cf. Costa
et al. 2009). By contrast, elderly people with a decreased cognitive control and flexibility
might not be able to integrate visual knowledge and world knowledge the way adult subjects
do (cf. Zelazo et al. 2004). We are currently exploring these possibilities in our lab.
Generalizability of the Results
This study focused on comprehension of only two size terms—groot ‘big’ and klein ‘small’,
which allowed to administer the same task with children of all age groups. As explained
earlier in this paper, using more specific dimensional adjectives, such as ‘long’, ‘high’, or
‘wide’ would have made the task too difficult for the youngest age groups (Bartlett 1975;
Brewer and Stone 1975; Eilers et al. 1974; Tribushinina in press). An important question to
ask then is to what extent the results can be generalized to other dimensional adjectives and
to relative adjectives in general.
Another important question concerns ecological validity of the experiment. Recall that the
subjects had to take two kinds of comparison classes into account—the conceptual compar-
ison class (knowledge of how big, say, hippos are) and the perceptual comparison class (the
visually given range). Although people often use these two types of comparison classes for
making dimensional judgments, the operationalization of the perceptual comparison class
under laboratory conditions is different from what it would usually be in natural settings.
Imagine that you see seven elephants in the zoo and that all of them are relatively small com-
pared to a mental representation of an average-sized elephant (i.e. relative to the conceptual
reference point). In this case, you can legitimately call the elephants ‘small’ by just relating
their size to a stored image of a normal elephant. But if the size of the elephants in that visually
given comparison class varies and you would like to make more specific judgments about the
size of a particular elephant, which happens to be bigger than an average elephant in that zoo,
you may need to fine-tune your spatial judgments by coordinating two reference points—an
average height of the elephants at that particular place (perceptual reference point) and an
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average size of a typical elephant stored in your long-term memory (conceptual reference
point). It might be the case that a natural situation like this would provide more valuable cues
and enable a child to coordinate the two types of reference points at a somewhat younger
age. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to conduct comprehension experiments of this
kind in natural settings and to keep all variables constant across subjects.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to assume that younger children’ inability to over-ride the
perceptual cues and to choose an interpretation driven by more abstract, conceptual factors is
an across-the-board phenomenon. Firstly, recall that the experiments reported in Smith et al.
(1986, 1988) using objects (rather than pictures) moving in real space provided very similar
results. It is only at age five that children in these experiments were able to take both the
perceptual range and their conceptual knowledge of object classes into account for assigning
meanings to the adjectives high and low. The fact that testing a different pair of adjectives in a
different language using a different procedure provided largely comparable results suggests
that the findings from the present study may be generalized to other dimensional adjectives.
I leave this issue for future experimental scrutiny.
Secondly, the present results are also in line with the findings on the extension of nouns.
Several experiments by Landau, Smith and Jones (Landau et al. 1996, 1998; Smith et al.
1996) showed that children younger than age five have trouble integrating conceptual knowl-
edge and perceptual cues in object-naming tasks. Even if the relevant conceptual information
(e.g. object function) is accessible, younger children still generalize on the basis of the visual
cues (e.g. shape) without bringing in their conceptual knowledge of object functions (see also
Gentner 1878; Tomikawa and Dodd 1980). By contrast, adults and older children generalize
strongly on the basis of function. Thus, before age five children tend to rely primarily on the
perceptually salient visual cues even if they have relevant conceptual knowledge. Age five
appears to be an important milestone in the development of a child, because at this age children
learn to take multiple perspectives on the same object and to combine strategies for solving
problems (De Mulder 2011; Frye et al. 1995; Zelazo et al. 1996; Zelazo and Reznik 1991).
One manifestation of this emerging capacity is the ability of 5-year-olds to integrate percep-
tual information with conceptual knowledge for making context-specific interpretations of
spatial adjectives. The inhibition capacity also shows significant development between ages
three and six (Davidson et al. 2006), allowing children to over-ride the perceptually salient
cues and to involve more abstract, and therefore less accessible, conceptual knowledge.
Taken as a whole, the results show that semantic development of adjectives may have a
protracted time course. Although size terms such as big and small are among the first adjec-
tives acquired by children (Blackwell 2005; Nelson 1976; Ravid et al. 2010; Saylor 2000),
their interpretation is not adult-like until, at least, age seven. In situations where dimensional
adjectives are interpreted with respect to only one standard of comparison, 4-year-old children
may make target-like interpretations. However, an adult-like interpretation of relative terms
crucially hinges on the ability to dynamically construe context-specific reference points by
combining their world knowledge with the information provided by the perceptual context.
The development of this ability extends far beyond age three.
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